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Abstract
　　Asset Based Lending (ABL) is a lending technology that uses business assets, such as 
inventory and accounts receivable, to secure a loan. ABL is an established form of lending in 
the US, but was only recently introduced to Japan. 
　　Like all secured lenders, ABL lenders have the right to repossess and liquidate collateral. 
I argue that when business assets such as inventory and accounts receivable become collateral 
there is an additional role. This paper demonstrates through a case study that ABL increases 
the frequency of contact between lenders and borrowers. Because of this frequent contact 
with the borrower prior to and after the loan is made, ABL facilitates the lender in generating 
information about the creditworthiness of the borrower. 
　　Furthermore, because the value of the collateral used in ABL is directly linked with the 
business of the borrower, properly monitoring the collateral helps the lender manage the credit 
risk. This is why ABL is an important lending technology for Japanese banks. 
　　This paper articulates the unique characteristics of ABL and the implications they have for 
Japan’s lending market by (1) discussing the role of collateral by reviewing related literature, (2) 
presenting a case study conducted with a Japanese regional bank, (3) comparing how regulators 
treat ABL in Japan and the US, and (4) concluding with policy recommendations to further 
promote ABL.
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Introduction
　　What are the roles of collateral? Do they change with the type of asset used as 
collateral? These questions become relevant when a new asset class is introduced as 
collateral in the loan market, as has happened recently in Japan. Therefore, we have a unique 
opportunity to analyze and answer these questions. 
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　　Asset Based Lending (ABL) is a lending technology (Udell 2004) which uses business 
assets such as inventory and accounts receivable as collateral. I argue that, by properly 
assessing and monitoring the collateral, ABL can generate information about the 
creditworthiness of the borrower. This is a unique characteristic of ABL that is unavailable 
when real estate is used as collateral.
　　Collateral serves an important role in reducing the risk of the secured creditor by 
providing a priority claim to a specific asset. However, whether the expected value of the 
collateral can be realized is at the mercy of the market, requiring time and cost to liquidate 
the asset. Therefore, it is an established practice for bankers not to rely on the liquidation 
value of collateral as a primary source of repayment. Instead, successful banks are careful 
in selecting borrowers who can repay the loan by cash flow generated from their ordinary 
course of business１. Banks, as financial intermediaries, are delegated the role to produce 
information about the creditworthiness of the borrower through screening and monitoring 
(Diamond, 1984). To perform such role, banks must understand the borrower’s business in 
depth. In doing so, banks not only analyze the borrower’s financial statements but must 
frequently contact the borrower to acquire and accumulate intimate knowledge. This is 
particularly true for small and medium size companies, who are “informationally opaque” 
(Udell, 2004, p. 15) compared to large and public companies.
　　Unfortunately, banks have not always behaved as they should. For example, Japanese 
banks relied excessively on unrealistic collateral values of real estate in the 1980s which 
ultimately led to a financial crisis. They learned the hard way that relying on a perceived 
liquidation value of collateral can be quite risky. 
　　Monitoring real estate used as collateral does not produce relevant or timely information 
about the creditworthiness of the borrower. To begin with, lenders are not required to 
frequently monitor real estate; once or twice a year is considered sufficient in most cases. 
Furthermore, lenders are able to monitor real estate without actively involving the borrower. 
Excessive reliance on real estate not only culminated in an economic crisis from which Japan 
has not yet fully recovered, but also may have weakened the banks’ ability to screen and 
monitor the borrower (Uchida 2010).
　　This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature on collateral by demonstrating 
through a case study that ABL increases the frequency of contact between the lender and 
borrower in order to generate information on the creditworthiness of the borrower. Because 
ABL is new to Japan, it is possible to consider its effect by looking at the behavior of lenders 
｜ 73 ｜
Asset Based Lending （ABL） in Japan
before and after its implementation. 
　　Like all secured lenders, ABL lenders have the right to repossess and liquidate the 
collateral. This paper argues that when business assets such as inventory and accounts 
receivable become collateral there is an additional role. Since ABL requires the lender 
to frequently have contact with the borrower prior to and after the loan is made, ABL 
facilitates the lender to generate information with regard to the creditworthiness of the 
business. Furthermore, because the value of the collateral used in ABL is directly linked with 
the business of the borrower, properly monitoring the collateral helps the lender manage 
the credit risk. This is why ABL is an important lending technology for Japanese banks. As 
far as I know, this is the first empirical study that examines whether ABL increases the 
frequency of contacts between the lender and borrower in Japan.
　　Unlike Japan, ABL is well established in the US. The Commercial Finance Association 
estimates the overall US ABL market to total approximately USD 620 billion in loans 
outstanding in 2012 (Thomas 2013, November), which is equivalent to 20% of the corporate 
lending market.
　　The Japanese government has been promoting ABL for the last 10 years. According to 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the outstanding balance of ABL in 
Japan is around JPY 400 billion, which is approximately 0.1% of the corporate lending market 
(Figure 1). Although the total market size is small, 184 financial institutions conducted 3,371 
ABL loans in 2011 (MRI 2013). 
　　This paper is constructed as follows２. First, it discusses the role of collateral by 
reviewing related literature. Second, a case study conducted for a Japanese regional bank is 
presented to see whether ABL increases the frequency of contact between the lender and 
Figure
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borrower. Third, the paper reviews the process and policy measures regarding how ABL 
was introduced to Japan, and compares this with how regulators in the US treat ABL. The 
paper concludes with policy recommendations to further promote ABL.
Ⅰ．Roles of Collateral
１．Preventing Moral Hazard
　　Economists have been studying the function of collateral as an extension of asymmetric 
information theory. Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) articulate a model 
in insurance defining the concept of moral hazard. Moral hazard refers to a contracting 
problem, where the actions of one party cannot be observed or disciplined by others. This 
problem is acute in the relationship between a lender and a borrower. Borrowers have the 
incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior at the lender’s expense. Borrowers may use 
the money borrowed unproductively, or against the best interest of the lender. Therefore, 
prudent lenders find a way to prevent such conflict of interest with the borrower. The right 
to repossess and liquidate collateral gives lenders a viable threat to ensure that borrowers 
do not behave against the interest of the lender. This disciplinary role of collateral is the core 
concept in the theory of incomplete financial contracts.
　　From the perspective of the lender, Boot and Thakor (1994) created a model predicting 
that lenders will demand collateral to prevent moral hazard problems３. The model suggest 
that when information is less asymmetric between the lender and borrower, the need for 
collateral should be less. Berger and Udell (1995) conducted empirical research to test such 
a theory and found that borrowers who had long-term relationships with a lender were less 
likely to pledge collateral. Such theoretical and empirical research supports the general view 
of lending that when a borrower posts collateral, the bank becomes more comfortable and 
thus less conservative in approving the loan. 
　　From the prospective of the borrower, Bester (1985) and Chan and Thakor (1987) 
established a model explaining that a borrower with less risk will use collateral to “signal” 
that message４. Subsequently, Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991) provided empirical research that 
supported this model.
　　In the unfortunate event when the borrower defaults and is unable to repay the loan, the 
lender can liquidate the collateral and thus mitigate its loss, while the borrower often goes 
out of business. Therefore, giving the lender a strong legal right to repossess and liquidate 
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the collateral is at the core of emphasizing the importance of protecting a creditor’s right 
under bankruptcy procedures. As a result, traditional studies of collateral have assumed the 
significance of the liquidation value of collateral５.
２．Tradeoff
　　Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) argue that if a bank is protected by collateral, its 
incentive to exert effort in evaluating loans may be reduced, because it can recoup the 
value of the loan by seizing the collateral. If the bank is not protected by collateral, the bank 
evaluates the loan more carefully, because they do not obtain much if a firm’s project fails. As 
a result, although a bank may be in a good position to evaluate the profitability of a planned 
investment project and the creditworthiness of the borrower, a high level of collateral may 
weaken the bank’s incentive to do so. Thus, too much reliance on the loss mitigation role of 
collateral “may induce banks to be ‘lazy’ and screen credit seekers insufficiently” (Manove 
et al., 2001, p. 739). A tradeoff exists between preventing the borrower’s moral hazard and 
giving incentive to lenders to screen borrowers.
　　Real estate is the predominant asset used for collateral. 84.5% of collateral is real estate 
in today’s Japan (Bank of Japan, 2011)６. The Financial Services Agency (FSA) estimates 
that approximately 90% of collateral for secured lending for small and medium enterprises 
consists of real estate (FSA, 2013a). A solid legal framework to perfect the secured party’s 
rights, combined with ne teitouken, a type of open-end mortgage, gives strong legal protection 
to the lender (Wagatsuma, 1978). They also provide a mechanism to convert the rise of real 
estate value to an increase in collateral value (Ohgaki, 2010).
　　Real estate has served well in deterring the borrower’s moral hazard. Also, as long as 
the value of real estate was rising or stable, it provided excellent protection for mitigating 
losses to the lender in the event of a default. However, following Manove, Padilla and 
Pagano’s (2001) argument, it may have discouraged lenders from appropriately screening the 
borrower. In addition, the concept or practice of monitoring collateral to gauge and manage 
the borrower’s credit risk does not exist when real estate is collateral. In fact, real estate was 
considered ideal because its liquidation value was independent of the borrower’s business 
condition. Once a loan secured by real estate is delivered, the bank should only be concerned 
about the liquidation value of the collateral. As Kubota (2008) points out, loss mitigation by 
liquidation has been the primary focus on the role collateral plays in Japan.
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３．Liquidation vs. Information
　　Until recently, analysis of the role of collateral beyond the context of liquidation and 
preventing moral hazard for the borrower was not necessary in Japan where real estate 
was the predominant collateral used. Participants in the lending market, including lenders, 
borrowers and often regulators, have perceived the role of collateral under that premise.
　　However, legal scholars have questioned such views as overly simplistic. For example, 
Scott (1986) challenges the view that collateral only functions as an asset to be liquidated to 
mitigate loss on the defaulted loans by foreclosure. Instead, he asserts that “the cornerstone 
of any effective secured loan is monitoring the financial condition of the health of the 
borrower” through “frequent investigation of the condition, quality and maintenance of 
the collateral” (Scott, 1986, p. 946). Mann (1997) conducted empirical research from a legal 
perspective to question the “classic presupposition that the function of secured credit is to 
enhance the creditor’s ability to liquidate collateral” and concluded that “the creditor’s ability 
to liquidate the collateral and the origination of a secured loan is much looser than traditional 
analysis would suggest” (p.238). 
　　Some economists have proposed that collateral can become a medium for communication 
between the lender and borrower. For example, Berger and Udell (1995) and Udell (2004) 
stress the information production value of collateral through intense monitoring by lenders, 
particularly when the collateral is accounts receivable and/or inventory. Mester, Nakamura 
and Renault (2007) provide empirical evidence that support Udell (2004) by conducting a case 
study with a Canadian bank that conducts ABL. Rajan and Winton (1995) provide theoretical 
support on the incentives of why banks conduct such monitoring activities. Berger, Frame 
and Ioannidou (2011) argue that the different roles and emphasis that collateral plays may 
depend on the type of asset used.
Ⅱ．ABL in Japan – A Case Study
　　Does ABL enhance information production for the lender through the monitoring of 
collateral? If that is the case, the amount of contact between the ABL lender and borrower 
should increase. To test the hypothesis, I conducted a case study with a Japanese regional 
bank that wishes to remain anonymous. To my knowledge, this article is the first direct 
empirical test of the monitoring activities of a Japanese ABL lender. Even though the data 
come from a particular bank, given that the bank is a typical, regional bank with an asset 
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size of approximately JPY 4 trillion, the content is likely to broadly represent the impact 
ABL has on any Japanese regional bank’s behavior.
　　I analyzed the bank’s call report on clients that became borrowers of ABL and 
compared whether there were changes in the number of (1) contacts with the ABL borrower 
in general and (2) meetings with top executives (e.g., representative directors, owners of the 
borrower). The number of such contacts or meetings was annualized before and after the 
transaction for ABL began７. There were a total of 30 borrowers. New borrowers who had 
no relationship with the bank were excluded because a comparison was impossible. 21 semi-
structured interviews were conducted by bank officers and executives who were responsible 
for the ABL business.
　　The results show that ABL clearly increased the number of contacts between the 
lender and borrower. The number of contacts in general increased with 22 borrowers (73.3% 
of total) and with 23 borrowers (76.7% of total) for top executives. Among the borrowers 
that had an increase in contacts or visits, the average number of contacts with borrowers 
increased by 27.6% (Figure 2), and a jump of 72.6% (Figure 3) observed for visits with top 
executives.
　　The interviewees consistently indicated that ABL required a deeper and more 
comprehensive understanding of the borrower’s business, risk profile and operating cycle. In 
doing so, the lender had to expand beyond their usual contact points, which were typically 
finance and accounting departments, to communicate with manufacturing, administration, 
sales and planning departments. Furthermore, they had to meet with the top executives 
to comprehend the whole picture, resulting in a substantial increase in such meetings. The 
situation began from making a proposal on ABL and continued after the loan was executed 
by conducting a monitoring of the collateral, which required close contact and cooperation 
with the borrower.
　　The interviewees remarked that when real estate is used as collateral, an increase 
in contacts with borrowers in general or with top executives were rare. In fact, with real 
estate, banks conduct monitoring only once or twice a year which do not require any contact 
with the client. The bank simply renews the database to reflect the market price of real 
estate (which is disclosed in the public domain) and physically observe the collateral on its 
own.
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　　This case study supports the hypothesis that ABL enables the lender to generate 
information about the borrower through screening prior to lending and by monitoring 
collateral after disbursement of the loan. The benefit of introducing ABL to Japan is to add 
another role for collateral – a medium of communication between the lender and borrower 
– in addition to its use for liquidation. Therefore, ABL should not be viewed simply as a 
secured lending where collateral is substituted by inventory and accounts receivable from 
real estate. When conducted properly, ABL could become a useful tool kit for the lender 
that has a role which real estate does not have. However, as we will see in the next section, 
the importance of monitoring the collateral to understand and manage the credit risk of the 
borrower was not clearly communicated to the market when ABL was introduced to Japan.
Figure
Figure
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Ⅲ．The Introduction of ABL to Japan
　　Because real estate has been the predominant asset used for collateral in post-war 
Japan, it was quite natural for the market, including lenders, borrowers and regulators, to 
have a fixed notion that the purpose of collateral is to mitigate losses when the borrower 
fails to meets its loan obligations and to deter moral hazard. Indeed, ABL does serve these 
purposes. However, looking back, the role that real estate lacks, i.e., serving as a medium 
for communication between the lender and borrower, should have been emphasized 
more clearly. Overly stressing the role of liquidation in ABL may have misguided market 
participants, including both banks and borrowers.
Policy Making
　　ABL was introduced to Japan in a coordinated, top down process led by the government. 
First, an overall strategy was announced, followed by recommendations from the deliberation 
councils (shingikai), and then legislative as well as regulatory changes were made.
　　Because Japanese banks were relying heavily on real estate as collateral, the collapse of 
the real estate market, which peaked in the early 1990s, hampered the lending capability of 
these financial institutions. The collateral in ABL was understood primarily as a substitute 
for real estate８. Table 1 summarizes the major policy measures on ABL.
Table 1: Major Policy on ABL
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Comparison: How Japan and the US Regulate ABL
Japan - The FSA Bank Inspection Manual
　　In 2007, the FSA revised its inspection manual (FSA, 2012)９ and officially recognized 
inventory and accounts receivable as “ordinary collateral (ippan tampo)10”. The criteria on 
whether inventory or accounts receivable was deemed to be ordinary collateral was whether 
such assets were disposable from an objective perspective.
　　In accordance with the self-assessment guidelines (Jiko Satei Beppyou 1 and 2), the bank 
must take a two-step approach in calculating the required amount for write-offs and default 
reserves. First, the bank conducts borrower classifications (saimusha kubun) in accordance 
with the probability of repayment of each credit (saiken), including loans. Then, each credit, 
which has been subject to borrower classification, is categorized in accordance with the 
level of collectability (saiken bunrui). In the credit categorization process, which determines 
the amount for write-offs and default reserves11, the estimated disposal value of the general 
collateral (shobun kanou mikomigaku) is taken into account (Horie and Arioka, 2012). 
　　Such treatment is identical to when real estate is collateral. Likewise, throughout 
the revised inspection manual, there was no direct or indirect stipulation with regard 
to monitoring inventory and accounts receivable to understand and manage the 
creditworthiness of the borrower. 
US - The OCC Comptroller’s Handbook
　　The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is one of the key bank regulatory 
institutions in the U.S.12 It has published the Comptroller’s Handbook: “Accounts Receivable 
and Inventory Financing (ARIF)” (the “Handbook”), which provides a detailed explanation 
specifically dedicated to loans secured by such business assets13 (OCC, 2000). The principal 
concept in the Handbook is the monitoring of collateral. Because inventory and accounts 
receivable are directly related with the business condition of the borrower, by carefully 
monitoring the collateral, and “exercising the degree of control to manage and mitigate the 
risks” (p.2) the ARIF lender can effectively manage the creditworthiness of the borrower. 
Consequently, the Handbook devotes a detailed description to how to monitor ARIF loans. In 
contrast, there is less emphasis and explanation on assessing liquidation value (OCC, 2000, pp. 
28-31).
　　Because of the nature of working capital, “receivable and inventory levels tend to 
fluctuate (p.28).” The intensiveness of monitoring and level of control that the ARIF lender 
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needs to exert depends on the creditworthiness of the borrower. The OCC supervises 
whether the ARIF lender is effectively monitoring the operating cycle of the borrower 
by examining the borrowing so that it “conforms closely to the buildup of inventory and 
collection of receipts as reported on the borrowing base certificates14” (p. 28). Lenders are 
expected to increase the intensiveness of monitoring as the creditworthiness of the borrower 
becomes weaker.
Ⅳ．Promoting “Information Collateral”
　　The most significant contribution that ABL can make in the Japanese lending market is 
to establish an understanding and practice to manage credit risk by adequately monitoring 
business assets, such as inventory and accounts receivable15. This is the antithesis of the 
existing notion of collateral, i.e., loss mitigation and prevention of moral hazard derived from 
the possibility of liquidating the collateral. Real estate has been effective in performing the 
existing role. To emphasize the difference, collateral used in ABL should be conceptually 
called “information collateral” in contrast to “liquidation collateral,” such as real estate.
　　Because the market has been heavily relying on real estate for collateral for too long, 
there is a possibility that Japanese banks may have become “lazy”, as defined by Manove 
et al. (2001), not sufficiently developing the practice and technology necessary to effectively 
screen and monitor the creditworthiness of borrowers. By focusing on the information 
generating aspect of ABL through proper monitoring of collateral, ABL can contribute 
to helping banks improve their skills in deeply understanding and managing their client’s 
creditworthiness, which is the essence of sound commercial banking.
　　Recent developments in Japan indicate that banks that have accumulated practical 
experience in ABL are convinced that they can generate information about the borrower by 
adequately monitoring the collateral. After investigating such practices, the Financial System 
Council (FSC), an advisory committee to the FSA, has been emphasizing the importance of 
monitoring in ABL. 
　　The Council has been advocating that ABL, when used properly, should meet the 
goal of region-based relationship banking (chiiki micchakugata kinyu) in terms of “making 
possible the timely and adequate understanding of the enterprise value (of the borrower) 
through continuous and periodic monitoring” (FSC, 2007, p.9). Recently, in a working paper, 
it has reported on the activities of regional banks utilizing ABL as a means to mitigate the 
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asymmetric information between lender and borrower (FSC, 2012, pp. 20-21).
　　As an extension of these discussions, the FSA has issued a series of documents to 
promote the usage of ABL, emphasizing the function of collateral to facilitate better 
communication between the lender and borrower through monitoring activities (FSA, 2013a). 
In addition, it has published a paper to clarify the treatment of collateral for ABL in the 
Inspection Manual16 in the form of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ). (FSA, 2013b). 
　　In the FAQ, the FSA has indicated that collateral in ABL has a distinctive function 
to enable the lender to have a comprehensive understanding of the borrower, in addition 
to and independent of its role to mitigate loss via liquidation value17. Therefore, when the 
collateral in ABL is used to comprehend the creditworthiness and business of the borrower, 
by definition, it is not required to meet the conditions to be classified as ordinary collateral as 
defined in the Inspection Manual (Ikeda, 2013). 
　　Some academics, including Berger and Udell (2002), argue that ABL should be 
categorized as a product for transactions lending18. However, as we have seen, ABL in 
Japan, particularly for regional banks, serves best when extracting the information value of 
collateral19. Therefore, ABL for regional banks in Japan is and should be used to enhance the 
relationship between the lender and borrower.
　　To further promote the role of “information collateral”, several measures need to 
be taken. First, the banks and regulators must understand that ABL is a unique lending 
technology that requires dedicated effort by professionals. Therefore, it is very important 
that a specialized team should be responsible for conducting ABL in banks to accumulate 
knowledge and knowhow. Such mechanism should not necessarily be complex, expensive, 
or time consuming. Unlike appraising the liquidation value of collateral, which will require 
professional service firms to do so, monitoring can be conducted by the banks themselves 
without paying expensive fees20. Second, banks must quickly develop a monitoring 
infrastructure to detect deterioration of the borrower’s credit. Such an early warning system 
should be linked with an escalation mechanism for the bank to intensify its monitoring 
of the collateral and, as needed, actively intervene to rectify the situation. Third, banks, 
particularly regional banks, should share knowledge and best practices with regard to what 
specific aspects of collateral to monitor and how to do it. Currently, the banks are not yet 
confident with specifically what and how to monitor (including depth and frequency). The 
FSA, the Bank of Japan and industry associations (e.g., the Regional Bank’s Association) can 
contribute to sharing and accumulating such knowledge and techniques. Last but not least, 
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empirical research on ABL needs to be promoted to provide academic insight, as well as 
recommendations. Further studies should include a deeper analysis of monitoring collateral 
both from quantitative and qualitative perspectives. A better understanding and proper 
execution of ABL are critical for the development of the Japanese economy.
NOTES
１　Scott (1986) quotes a senior banker: “Banks are not pawn shops. No bank I know would make a loan 
against a basket of gold bricks if there was a good chance it would have to sell the bricks” (p. 944). 
２　This paper will refer to documents that are originally written in Japanese. The official translations of 
such documents are used when they are available in the public domain. Otherwise, the translations 
are the author’s own. Please note that the original authors have not officially authenticated these 
translations. Unfortunately, many Japanese government documents are not accompanied by an 
official English translation.
３　Referred to as the “ex post theory” of “lender selection effect” of collateral.
４　Referred to as the “borrower selection”, or “ex ante effect” of collateral.
５　For example, the Oxford Dictionary of Economics elaborates on the definition of collateral: “If 
payments of interest and repayments of the principal are not made on time, in the last resort the 
lender can sell the collateral asset.” Economists refer to this function as the “loss mitigation effect” 
of collateral.
６　Before the Second World War, tradable securities such as stocks and bonds were the predominant 
asset classes used for collateral (Goto, 1970).
７　“Before”: Beginning date of the call reports until the prior day of the proposal to do ABL. “After”: 
On the date of the proposal of the ABL to the last day of the call report.
８　Kinoshita (2004) pointed out that ABL can enhance the communication between the lender and 
borrower.
９　The content of the inspection manual has not materially changed from the 2007 version.
10　Technically, inventory was stipulated as a type of movable assets (dosan) ad accounts receivable as 
claims (saiken) in the inspection manual.
11　Write-offs and default reserves negatively impact the profit of the bank.
12　The OCC was established in 1863 as an independent bureau of the US Department of the Treasury 
with a primary mission to charter, regulate, and supervise all national banks and federal savings 
associations” (OCC, 2012).
13　The OCC categorizes Accounts Receivable and Inventory Financing to four types, Asset Based 
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Lending (ABL), Secured Financing, Blanket Receivable Lending and Factoring (p.6). What is called 
“ABL” in Japan is much broader than the OCC’s definition of ABL, and is equivalent to ARIF.
14　A document issued by the ARIF borrower representing the maximum amount that can be 
borrowed in terms of collateral type, eligibility, and advance rates.
15　This is in addition to the role of loss mitigation and preventing moral hazard through liquidation of 
collateral.
16　The immediate reason for the FAQ is that the Inspection Manual was being revised due to the 
termination of the SME Finance Facilitation Act.
17　Technically, when the lender fails to prevent the borrower’s credit from deteriorating in spite of 
monitoring the collateral and taking appropriate measures, the necessity to consider whether the 
collateral can qualify as “ordinary collateral” emerges.
18　Berger and Udell (2002) define ABL as lending that is principally based on the quality of the 
available collateral, not from information on the payment from cash flow of the borrower which can 
be generated through the relationship with the borrower.
19　OCC (2000) categorizes loans secured by accounts receivable and inventory into 4 types, 
demonstrating that there are variations for such loans. ABL as defined by Berger and Udell (2002) 
falls to the extreme case of such group which is probably best served by a finance company. 
20　A thorough appraisal to determine the liquidation value conducted by a professional service firm 
costs JPY 2～3 million. Considering that the average size of ABL done in Japan is JPY 56 million, 
this is expensive.
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